

# Coalitions Matter: Citizenship, Women, and Quota Adoption in Africa<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This study provides new theory and evidence of the role of domestic women's coalitions in the adoption of gender quotas. Previous research has shown the importance of women's movements to policy change. This study shows that specific types of mobilization, often multiethnic in character, are a more precise way of describing these influences. Using a new dataset of coalitions in 50 countries in Africa (1989-2014), we first examine where coalitions are likely to emerge. Controlling for factors that correlate with their formation, we find that when domestic women's organizations form a coalition for quotas, governments are more likely to adopt them and do so more quickly. This correlation holds when controlling for international aid, involvement of international women's movements, and whether countries recently emerged out of major armed conflict, complementing recent scholarship that highlights global influences. A comparative case study of the adoption of a gender quota in Senegal and non-adoption in Benin helps illustrate the nuances of the theory.

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## **Coalitions Matter: Citizenship, Women, and Quota Adoption in Africa**

There have been two moments in contemporary history when women's citizenship in the form of political rights expanded globally. The first was the extension of full suffrage to women, which started in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the second was a major increase in women's legislative representation, starting in the mid-1990s.<sup>1</sup> While both moments were influenced by international and domestic events, most crossnational studies explaining the quadrupling of women's descriptive representation between 1990 and 2015 (from 7.7 to 28.4 percent) have focused on the role of foreign donors, transnational advocacy networks, and global events like the 1995 United Nations (UN) Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.<sup>2</sup> Most crossnational studies have focused on the international dimension, in part, because it is easier to quantify using data produced by international actors.<sup>3</sup>

This article shows how the domestic and international dimensions worked in tandem in African countries after the 1990s to improve women's political representation, however, we draw on new evidence to focus on the role of women's coalitions in these processes. Our findings take us beyond the work of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, who show how domestic actors bring international pressure to bear on reluctant states to advance women's rights.<sup>4</sup> While this has been a tactic employed by some social movements, we show that without significant pressure from within a country in the form of a coalition, quota laws are rarely adopted. Spreading in three waves, by 2016 at least 54 countries legally required party quotas and another 23 adopted reserved seats for women, but not all countries have introduced such reforms.<sup>5</sup>

Bridging the interest group, public policy, and social movement literatures on

collective action among organizations, we theorize that coalitions of organizations at the national level play an important role in multiple ways: (1) by identifying policy gaps, (2) by proposing specific policy solutions, (3) by adapting proposals to the national context, (4) by signaling domestic support, and (5) by signaling broad-based (e.g., multiethnic) support. Much of the literature on gender quotas to date has recognized the role of domestic factors in bringing about change, but not on coalitions as we do.<sup>6</sup>

Theories of coalitions of organizations have been developed and tested to better understand education, environmental, civil rights, regulatory, and social welfare policy mostly in the U.S. and Europe.<sup>7</sup> Scholars have compiled information about women's collective action through the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS), and S. Laurel Weldon's earlier work and subsequent study with Mala Htun developed comparative measures of women's movements, focusing primarily on established democracies.<sup>8</sup> Yet, the role of women's organizing largely remains untested in the global South, where gender quota laws first emerged.

Addressing these gaps, our paper provides a first test of the hypothesis that when women's organizations form a coalition for gender quotas, their countries are more likely to adopt them and do so at a faster pace. Inspired by work on women's movements in the U.S.,<sup>9</sup> we use a dataset that we created of pro-quota women's coalitions from 1989 to 2014 in 50 countries in Africa, where scholars expect international influences to be strong. Our measure is not the final word, but we hope it will inspire further work on domestic organizations and political change in the global South.

Using event history models, we conduct a two-step analysis. First, we ask where coalitions are likely to form to examine the possibility that they are endogenous. To help

minimize bias in our findings about coalitions, we then include variables that might correlate with the rise of coalitions in our statistical analysis of the adoption of quotas. We include a measure of postconflict status, which is found to be important in Africa, in part, because of the role disruptions in gender relations during conflict.<sup>10</sup> We also control for the type of electoral system and level of economic development. Ultimately, we find that domestic women's coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas in addition to having a postconflict context and connections to the international women's movement.

This study makes three contributions. First, we call attention to the formation and role of domestic women's coalitions—occupying a middle ground between individual policy entrepreneurs and transnational advocacy networks—in the spread of major innovations concerning women's rights. Second, we suggest that women's movements in the case of gender quotas take a particular form of coalition building across ethnic and political cleavages. Third, by examining how domestic pressures influence political reform, this study has implications for similar movements around climate change and other environmental issues, children's rights, human rights, and many other concerns.

The first section outlines our theory of domestic coalitions, followed by quantitative analyses of their rise and role relative to other influences. We compare Benin and Senegal to examine the nuances of our theory, and then discuss the importance of coalitions based on the statistical evidence and case studies. In the last section, we point to women's coalitions as a direction for future research on the implementation of women's rights reforms and substantive representation of women. Our conclusion further discusses the implications of our study for understanding major change in other policy areas, and for studies outside of Africa.

## **Domestic Women's Coalitions and Gender Quotas: A Meso-Level Theory**

Coalitions are the temporary, decision-oriented, joint use of resources by two or more social units. Coalitions work toward a decision (or what William Gamson calls, “a selection among alternatives”), which if realized, produces a payoff for the participants.<sup>11</sup> Since the advocacy explosion of the 1960s in the U.S., scholars of interest groups, public policy, and social movements have shared an interest in the emergence and impact of collective action among social organizations, which is our focus.<sup>12</sup>

Much of the literature on gender quotas has recognized the role of women's activism in bringing about these reforms, but few have sought to explicitly develop a theory of coalitions as we do. Some accounts focus on grassroots women's organizations,<sup>13</sup> cross-partisan networks,<sup>14</sup> women's organizations within parties,<sup>15</sup> and individuals within the national women's machinery.<sup>16</sup> The literature on Africa has also examined the role of women's mobilization in these various fora.<sup>17</sup>

Why focus on coalitions of organizations and not policy entrepreneurs, social movements, or transnational networks? We suggest that coalitions are in a distinct position to help name problems, propose and adapt specific policy solutions, and help signal domestic and broad-based support for change. While noting that countries may adopt major reforms in the absence of women's coalitions, we observe that in Africa it has been the case that coalitions are involved in quota adoption.

### *Coalitions Identify Problems*

When organizations come together, they can help identify and prioritize unequal representation as a problem of national import. Naming is critical for policy action.

Without the perception that something is wrong, policymakers may see no need for innovation. Individual policy entrepreneurs may be the first to identify a policy gap, but to put an issue on the national agenda, they require coalitions that pool human and financial resources. The joint use of resources is needed to disseminate pamphlets, issue press releases, speak on the radio and television, hold public meetings and workshops, and protest in the streets, as we will see in the case of Senegal. Sarah Soule and Brayden King's study of women's movements in the United States finds that women's organizations exert the most leverage over policymaking at this agenda-setting stage.<sup>18</sup> Scholars of women's movements in semi-authoritarian and authoritarian contexts such as Uganda find that women's groups help bring new issues to the national arena.<sup>19</sup> Thus, we expect domestic coalitions (and social movements) to play an agenda-setting role in democracies and at times in autocracies.

How do women's organizations come by the idea to name underrepresentation as a public problem? This is one of several ways in which the diffusion of ideas through transnational networks is important. Women's organizations can become inspired to identify new public problems through their participation in global conferences, by reading international treaties and declarations, or by hearing about women's successes or reform in other countries. Nevertheless, prior to the heightened efforts by the United Nations and other international entities to increase women's representation, it was often women on the ground in countries such as Tanzania and Uganda that articulated to domestic audiences the need to include more women in positions of power. For instance, the issue of women's underrepresentation became a national agenda item in the Republic of Niger only after leaders of women's organizations organized a massive protest in

1991.<sup>20</sup>

### *Coalitions Propose Specific Solutions*

Coalitions advocate for a decision. This makes them distinct from social movements, which are broader and may internally disagree over what kind of change is necessary.<sup>21</sup> Coalitions, as Kevin Hula writes, “serve as institutional mediators reconciling potentially disparate policy positions, in effect ‘predigesting’ policy proposals before they are served to the legislature.”<sup>22</sup> By articulating a preference for a specific policy, coalitions can help policymakers who are amenable to backing gender quotas for self-interested reasons but are faced with a surfeit of options. International statements such as the Beijing Platform of Action and Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) Plan of Action provide a large menu of choices for improving women’s descriptive representation, of which the adoption of a gender quota is only one.<sup>23</sup> Women on the ground, while not the only national-level actor that can propose specific policies, can and do suggest content for nascent quota legislation, as was the case in Uganda during the constitution making process.<sup>24</sup>

In the literature on African politics, scholars note that party systems in many countries are fragmented, making it a challenge for parties to coalesce interests.<sup>25</sup> One recent study finds that in the 2000s, civil society actors were more likely to stake out policy positions in the media than were political parties or candidates in seven African countries, except for Ghana and Kenya.<sup>26</sup> This suggests that coalitions of organizations may be influential not just in wealthy democracies in the global North but also in new democracies in the global South.

### *Coalitions Adapt Solutions to the National Context*

Sally Engle Merry argues that for internationally circulated ideas to be effective at home, they “need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning.”<sup>27</sup> Much of the existing qualitative scholarship on the adoption of quotas shows that women’s organizations use locally relevant frames that fit with pre-existing discourses to advocate for quotas.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the translation of norms into policy is not a smooth process, but one often marked with setbacks. Coalitions, working toward a common end, can help shepherd a policy through expected and unexpected roadblocks, as we explore below in our case study of Senegal. This persistent fine-tuning of new policy solutions is what sociologist Holly McCammon calls “strategic adaptation.”<sup>29</sup>

#### *Coalitions Signal Domestic Support*

Domestic coalitions can help signal to policymakers that demand for change is not only international. Policymakers, in the absence of clear domestic support, may not perceive new proposals as worth the investment of scarce resources. When asked about the role of the international community and the state in adopting quotas in Algeria, the lawyer and head of the local organization Le Centre d’information sur les droits de l’enfant et de la femme (CIDDEF) Nadia Ait-Zai responded:

We have been helped by the international communities. But the first work was done here in Algeria. When we wanted more representativeness of women in politics, the work was first made in Algeria and it is we who did it. Indeed, CIDDEF launched a partnership advocacy campaign with political parties and with associations to tell the president we wanted a quota for women in parliament and not less than 30 percent.<sup>30</sup>

Today at 32 percent, Algeria has the highest rate of representation of women in the Middle East and North Africa.

#### *Coalitions Signal Broad-based Support*



Coalitions can help signal mass support for major reform. Since the beginning of the 1990s, women's activists moved away from the post-independence phenomenon in which mobilization at the national level fell under one large national association that was often tied to the ruling party or the state. These organizations were not autonomous (e.g., Ghana's 31<sup>st</sup> December Women's Movement, Kenya's Maendeleo ya Wanawake, Nigeria's Better Life for Rural Women).<sup>31</sup> With democratization in the 1990s, statist associations of this type declined in prominence, and newer and smaller women's organizations proliferated.<sup>32</sup> In this contemporary political landscape, women's groups have sought to form coalitions.<sup>33</sup>

To be clear, not all groups need to agree that quotas ought to be a priority. In Algeria, women's groups agreed that increasing women's parliamentary representation was necessary, but some saw quotas as an elitist aspiration that could wait. Others thought the women elected would not be qualified, and there were divisions over quota adoption for this reason. But a coalition for gender quotas was formed nevertheless.

In societies where ethnic difference is politicized, coalitions that cut across salient cleavages can help demonstrate wide-ranging support for reform. Kenya's quota adoption process is a case in point. From the outset, women activists played a central role in the convoluted, acrimonious, and lengthy constitution making process in Kenya.<sup>34</sup> As Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai (the first head of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission) wrote, "They made full and skillful use of the opportunities opened up by the review for women in particular. . . . The group which came out best from the process were women, who were able to present a united and coordinated position, transcending ethnic or religious distinctions."<sup>35</sup> The activists not only advanced a women's rights agenda, but

they also played an important role in moving the overall process forward and finding common ground between competing groups. Bridging across difference has taken place in other polarized contexts. In Somalia, women's activists created a Rainbow Coalition cutting across clan differences to press for a quota in the constitution making process, with some degree of success. Similar multiethnic initiatives took place in other countries, in peace talks (e.g., Burundi<sup>36</sup>), constitutional reform processes (e.g., Zimbabwe), and legislative reform (e.g., Senegal).

Indeed, the politicization of ethnic difference may propel women to form coalitions. In patronage-based systems, women often are sidelined into what Linda Beck calls a "hidden public".<sup>37</sup> This is the case in countries such as Kenya, South Africa (particularly until 1994), and the U.S. (particularly until 1920) where a colonial state favored men over women and a postcolonial state perpetuated the political salience of ethnicity and race.<sup>38</sup> Further, scholars have found that ethnic minority parties in proportional representation systems are more likely than others to exclude women.<sup>39</sup> Multiethnic mobilization especially among women often occurs in the context of conflict as women build cross-cleavage coalitions to fight for peace and advance a women's rights agenda that often includes quotas.<sup>40</sup> Given that quotas ostensibly benefit all women, it should not be surprising that, for strategic reasons, women's organizations would draw multiethnic support for quotas among other demands.

In sum, while there is no question that individual policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of ideas from one country to the next are important in understanding domestic policy change, the adoption of gender quotas is not self-executing. We hypothesize that when women's organizations form a coalition for gender quotas, countries are more

likely to make the change and to do so at a faster pace.

### **Gender Quotas in Africa: A Quantitative Analysis**

Seeking to explain how major change occurs in women's rights by focusing on the adoption of gender quota laws, this section tests whether, when controlling for a variety of factors, domestic women's coalitions for gender quotas correlates with the likelihood and pace of adoption. Because the formation of coalitions may not be exogenous, we first consider where they are likely to emerge. We then include the same variables in the analysis of quota adoption to avoid producing spurious findings.<sup>41</sup>

We use discrete time event history models with the complementary log-log (clog-log) link function. Discrete time models are appropriate due to the interval nature of our data and presence of tied event times, as shown in figure 1.<sup>42</sup> The complementary log-log transformation is analogous to the popular Cox continuous time hazard model. It, however, requires the analyst to choose a representation of the underlying hazard function and test for violations of the proportional hazards assumption.<sup>43</sup> For these purposes, we use a linear variable for time, with which we interact select variables.<sup>44</sup>

We consider the risk of adoption to begin with Uganda's introduction of a reserved seat system in 1989. Countries enter the data set in this year, except for Eritrea and Namibia, which gained independence in 1993 and 1990 respectively, and exit when they experience the event in interest or reach the year 2014. The number of countries in the models varies from 41 to 50.

Our central dependent variable is the likelihood that a country will adopt a gender quota, given that it has not done so. By gender quotas, we mean constitutional provisions or legislation mandating a minimum 10 percent women's share of seats in the lower

house or unicameral legislature.<sup>45</sup> Twenty-seven countries in our sample adopted gender quotas between 1989 and 2014: Algeria (2012), Angola (2005), Burkina Faso (2009), Burundi (2004), Cape Verde (2010), Democratic Republic of Congo (2011), Republic of Congo (2007), Djibouti (2002), Egypt (2009), Eritrea (1994), Guinea (2010), Kenya (2010), Lesotho (2011), Liberia (2005)<sup>46</sup>, Libya (2012), Mauritania (2006), Morocco (2011), Niger (2000), Rwanda (2003), Senegal (2010), Sudan (2008), Swaziland (2005), Tanzania (1992), Togo (2012), Tunisia (2011), Uganda (1989), and Zimbabwe (2013). Somalia and South Sudan, excluded from the statistical tests, adopted a gender quota in 2004 and 2011 respectively.<sup>47</sup>

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

*Women's coalitions* equals zero as a default and takes a value of one if two or more domestic social organizations work collectively around the adoption of a party candidate law or reserved seat system for women in the lower house or unicameral legislature. Social organizations are often women's organizations, led by women and concerned with women's gendered experiences, but they can include others such as human rights associations. To code coalitions, we used a combination of secondary sources and news stories from more than 100 national newspapers, national wires, and international wires, conducting searches in Arabic, French, Portuguese, and Spanish, in addition to English. This method is similar to Alice Kang's work on civil society representation of women and the ratification of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, also known as the Maputo Protocol; ours differs in that we include secondary sources and code specifically for coalitions.<sup>48</sup> As some coalitions may be less visible, and to check that we

do not overlook unsuccessful ones, we corroborated our coding with country experts for countries where it was not apparent that a coalition had formed.

What does and does not count as a pro-quota coalition? We include formal (e.g., the Libyan Women's Platform for Peace) and informal coalitions (e.g., of the Association des femmes tunisiennes pour la recherche sur le développement and the Ligue tunisienne des droits de l'homme, among others, in Tunisia). Because the pursuit of a shared and specific goal is central to the concept of coalitions, organizations that do not make an explicit call for candidate quota laws or reserved seats are not coded as such. For instance, in Mali, women's organizations came together in a coalition, along with government allies, to advocate for a reform to the electoral code to include a gender quota for party lists.<sup>49</sup> (Mali has yet to adopt a gender quota.) By contrast, in Malawi, women's organizations have united around the issue of campaign finance.<sup>50</sup> We also looked for signs of cooperation among organizations (e.g., the issuing of a collective declaration, a joint meeting with a policymaker). In Botswana, we have not seen indications of coordination among multiple women's organizations for quotas. In Swaziland, one, but not multiple, organization called for a gender quota.<sup>51</sup> (Swaziland adopted a quota.)

Our models include controls for international or transnational influences. The growth (or decline) in the *International women's movement* may encourage domestic coalitions to form and countries to adopt quotas.<sup>52</sup> Countries where women are more embedded in the global women's movement may be more likely to have coalitions and quotas. To measure embeddedness, we use *Log women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million*, the natural log of the number of women's NGOs that attended the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 scaled by population size.<sup>53</sup> We include an interaction term

for the international women's movement and a country's embeddedness in the movement.<sup>54</sup> Countries may respond to incentives from established democracies to adopt gender quotas.<sup>55</sup> *Log DAC aid per capita (t-1)* is the natural log of official development aid per capita disbursed by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to country *i* in current US dollars, lagged one year.<sup>56</sup> This excludes aid from autocracies and semi-autocracies.<sup>57</sup> In models not reported here, we control for the presence of a liberalizing UN peacekeeping operation, which may transmit new ideas about what is beneficial for the country's reputation abroad and push for quotas.<sup>58</sup>

We also include controls for the domestic political context. The end of war may be an opportune time for the formation of coalitions and adoption of gender quotas.<sup>59</sup> *Postconflict* equals one if country *i* was in its last year of major armed conflict and through the first postconflict election; zero otherwise.<sup>60</sup> *Level of democracy*, based on Polity IV, varies from -10 to 10.<sup>61</sup> Transitions to democracy ostensibly create new opportunities for coalition formation and institutional reform, though not all new democracies adopt gender equality policies.<sup>62</sup> *Democratic transition* equals one if country *i* experienced a transition from autocracy (equal to or less than -6 on the Polity IV scale) to anocracy or a hybrid regime (-5 to 5); from anocracy to democracy (equal to or greater than 6); or from autocracy to democracy in the previous three years.

Other domestic political variables include the Ethnic Power Relations' *Number of ethnopolitical groups*, the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in country *i* in year *t*.<sup>63</sup> The politicization of ethnic difference may encourage women to form pro-quota coalitions, as discussed in the previous section. It may be easier to adopt quota laws in

proportional representation than in first-past-the-post systems.<sup>64</sup> *Plurality electoral system* equals one if country *i* uses a majoritarian electoral system for the lower house or unicameral legislature as of or close to January 1; zero otherwise.<sup>65</sup> If the legislature is suspended, we carry over the previous system. If the country is under one or no party rule, or if indirect elections are used, the variable is coded as missing, which makes plurality highly left-censored.<sup>66</sup> *Left-leaning rule* equals one if the party of the country's executive or largest party in year *t* is communist, socialist, or social democratic; zero otherwise.<sup>67</sup> *Women in parliament, %* is the percentage of women in the lower house or unicameral legislature in country *i* as of or near January 1 in year *t*.<sup>68</sup>

Finally, we include controls for socioeconomic and cultural conditions.

Modernization theory suggests poorer countries and predominantly Muslim countries may be slower to form coalitions or adopt gender quotas.<sup>69</sup> *Log GNI per capita (t-1)* is the natural log of gross national income per capita (Atlas method) for country *i* in current US dollars, lagged one year.<sup>70</sup> *Muslim majority* is one if 50.1 percent or more of the country's population is Muslim; zero otherwise.<sup>71</sup> *Female labor force (t-1), %* is the percentage of the formal labor force comprised of women in country *i*, lagged one year.<sup>72</sup>

### *The Formation of Coalitions*

Table 1 reports results from models in which coalition formation is the dependent variable. Countries that adopted quotas prior to 1995 are omitted from the analysis (Eritrea, Tanzania, Uganda). A positive coefficient indicates that the variable correlates with a higher likelihood of formation and that a coalition is likely to form sooner. Model 1 includes international variables. Model 2 adds domestic political and socioeconomic controls.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

As the first quantitative study of the rise of coalitions for gender quotas, our results are preliminary but nonetheless suggestive. Starting with international factors, the variable for international women's movement is positive but does not attain statistical significance. We note, however, that the global movement and time, which is positive and statistically significant, has a correlation of 0.88. If we omit time from the model, the variable for international women's movement becomes significant. Our interpretation is that if coalitions are more likely to form with every new year, it is *because* of the activity of the international movement. The variable for embeddedness and the interaction term are not statistically significant. Countries with higher levels of foreign aid from established democracies appear less likely and slower to see the rise of coalitions; in a few of our robustness checks, this negative relationship does not hold.

Turning to model 2, coalitions appear to form more quickly in postconflict countries, but the relationship changes over time.<sup>73</sup> Coalitions do not appear to be more likely or faster to form the more democratic the country is. The variable for the number of politically relevant ethnic groups is positive and statistically significant, although in our robustness check, an alternative measure that does not change over time and covers fewer countries, Daniel Posner's Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG), does not attain statistical significance.<sup>74</sup> Coalitions are significantly faster and more likely to form in poorer and majority Muslim countries and significantly slower to form in countries with plurality electoral systems.

Thus far, our results suggest that women's coalitions are more likely to form as time progresses and mixed evidence that women's coalitions are more likely to emerge



where there are more politicized ethnic groups. We now explore whether countries with women's coalitions are more likely to adopt gender quotas, controlling for these factors.

### *The Adoption of Gender Quotas*

A simple cross tabulation presented in table 2 suggests that there is a relationship between coalitions and the adoption of quotas. Coalitions for gender quotas emerged in 33 countries, of which 21 adopted a gender quota law or reserved seat system (63.6 percent). Of the 21 countries with no coalition, eight adopted a gender quota law or reserved seat system (38.1 percent). That some countries with coalitions did not adopt quotas and that others with quotas did not have coalitions suggest that our coding of coalitions is independent of whether they were successful.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Table 3 reports results that support our hypothesis that countries with domestic women's coalitions are more likely to adopt gender quotas and to do so faster than countries with no coalitions. Models 1 and 2 reflect the state of the quantitative scholarship. In model 3, we add our measure of women's coalitions, and in model 4, we exclude two variables with missing data to use the full sample of 50 countries.

The variable for coalition is positive and statistically significant in both models. The international women's movement does not correlate with adoption, but the variable for time is positive and statistically significant. A country's embeddedness in the international women's movement is positively associated with adoption and in model 4, the variable attains a conventional level of significance. The interaction term has a negative sign and is variably significant. The sign for the variable of aid from

democracies is positive, and in three models the variable attains conventional levels of significance.

As expected, the variable for postconflict is positive and statistically significant. There is mixed evidence that adoption is more likely in countries with lower levels of democracy. Using the Ethnic Power Relations' count of the number of politicized ethnic groups, we find a negative and significant relationship; when we employ Posner's measure, the correlation does not hold. The relationship between the introduction of quotas and electoral system varies over time, with plurality systems being less likely to adopt. The variable for wealth is not significant, while the variable for Muslim-majority changes in sign (in robustness checks) and level of significance.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4, we add four control variables and continue to find that women's coalitions are significantly and positively associated with the adoption of gender quotas. Model 1 suggests that countries that recently experienced a democratic transition are not more likely or faster to adopt gender quotas. Leftist countries and countries with higher percentages of women in parliament do not appear to be more likely or faster to adopt. The variable for women in the labor force is negative and attains significance, but the result is not robust in alternative models. When we end the study period in 2008, using Melanie Hughes and her colleagues' measure of embeddedness, coalitions continue to be related to adoption.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

To examine the substantive impact of domestic coalitions on the adoption of gender quotas, we predict the probability of adopting a gender quota for a baseline group,

as reported in table 5. We use results from model 3 in table 3 to calculate the probabilities, and because likelihood of adoption changes over time, we choose 2000 as the year. For an average country that is not postconflict and does not have a women's coalition, the probability of adopting a quota in 2000 is .04. If a women's coalition exists, the probability jumps to .37. If the country is postconflict and there is no coalition, the probability is higher, at .47. When we change the number of women's NGOs at Beijing from the 50th to the 90th percentile (from .37 to 1.45 NGOs per 1 million inhabitants), the probability of adoption is .06. Using the baseline and changing the year to 2010, the probability of adoption is .28. The connection between coalitions and the adoption of gender quotas comes near or surpasses that of other major explanatory factors.

[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

In results not reported here, we include more controls, and women's coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas in all these models. Whether countries have an official state religion does not correlate with the adoption of gender quotas while the percentage of the population that is Catholic does.<sup>75</sup> The year in which country *i* ratified CEDAW does not correlate with adoption.<sup>76</sup> We do not include a variable for whether a country ratified CEDAW because only three countries had not ratified CEDAW or ratified CEDAW during the study period: Mauritania (2001), Sudan (not ratified), and Swaziland (2004). As a final robustness check, we exclude potentially influential countries.

In all, we find clear support for the proposition that domestic women's coalitions are associated with the adoption of gender quotas. Coalitions for quotas do not appear to be endogenous to foreign aid from established democracies or to country ties to the

international women's movement but do seem to be connected to the march of time. We find mixed support for our claim that coalitions are more likely to emerge in contexts where ethnicity is highly politicized. Yet, controlling for all these factors, coalitions are strongly and positively related to quota adoption. Whether a country is postconflict, the amount of aid it receives from established democracies, and the year also correlate with adoption.

### **Comparative Case Study: Benin and Senegal**

Our large-scale analysis shows that between 1989 and 2014, women's coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas. A most-similar comparison of the passage of a parity law in Senegal and non-adoption in Benin helps us examine the nuances of our main finding.

The cases of Benin and Senegal can be generalized to non-postconflict democracies that use a mixed or PR electoral system. (Benin employs proportional representation, and Senegal has had a parallel system since 1983.) Compared to the region, Benin and Senegal received average levels of foreign aid, had average levels of GNI per capita, and had average numbers of politicized ethnic groups (4 and 5, respectively) (see table 6).<sup>77</sup>

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Domestic women's organizations in Senegal jointly used resources to name underrepresentation as a major problem, to propose and adapt new policies, and to signal domestic and broad support for a parity law, which they won in 2010. After the passage of the law, the number of female parliamentary representatives nearly doubled, jumping from 23 to 43 percent of the seats with the 2012 elections.

In Senegal, the problem of women's underrepresentation and the call for gender quotas was spearheaded by the umbrella group *Conseil sénégalais des femmes* (the Senegalese Council of Women, COSEF). In 1998, COSEF began raising the issue of quotas with various political parties, which promised to voluntarily implement them. After the 1998 elections, however, it was evident that moral commitment by the country's leaders was insufficient, and COSEF decided it needed a legal means to bring about parity. Meanwhile, Abdoulaye Wade, who became president of Senegal in 2000, had made campaign promises regarding gender parity. In 2004 under Wade, Senegal ratified the African Union Maputo Protocol which includes a provision around gender parity. Senegal also added the protocol to its constitution. COSEF seized on this moment to advance the issue.<sup>78</sup>

Adapting its policy goals toward a gender quota law, in 2005, COSEF launched the "Together, let's strengthen democracy with gender parity!" campaign. It received input from various legal and constitutional experts and worked with the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Children, and Female Entrepreneurship in a strategic alliance to get parity introduced into parliamentary elections. The coalition, however, maintained their independence from the ministry. They worked with women from political parties and, on March 23, 2007, held a demonstration signaling domestic and mass support in which women dressed in white and got the parties to support their campaign.

The National Assembly of Senegal passed a parity law on March 27, 2007, which was quickly followed on April 2 by a complaint by a dozen members of parliament against the law to Senegal's Constitutional Council. On April 27, the council declared the law unconstitutional, on the grounds of discrimination based on sex.<sup>79</sup>

Following the council's ruling on the unconstitutionality of the parity law, COSEF and its allies strategically adapted and pursued a new policy proposal: amend the country's constitution. Women's organizations met with President Wade on October 24, 2007, with Minister of Women Awa Ndiaye attending.<sup>80</sup> Fatou Kiné Diop, along with leaders of the Fédération des Associations Féminines du Sénégal (FAFS), Fédération Nationale des Groupements de Promotion Féminine (FNGPF), and Réseau Africain de Soutien à L'Entreprenariat Féminin (RASEF) called upon Wade to make the principle of parity part of the constitution. On December 13 and 26, the National Assembly and Senate, respectively, voted in favor of a bill to amend the constitution to state that the law promotes women's and men's equal access to public offices and positions. The parliament ratified the constitutional amendment on July 23, 2008. Senegal's gender parity law was adopted on May 28, 2010, mandating the alternation of party lists between male and female candidates. Since Senegal has a parallel electoral system, these provisions apply to proportional representation party lists and the seats contested through the plurality system in multimember constituencies. Thus, in a constituency with five seats, two would have to be filled by women.

To be clear, the international context mattered as did the strategic calculations of the political elite. Women's organizations had the support of foreign donors and were connected to the international women's movement. Women formed COSEF in the lead up to the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. After Senegal ratified the Maputo Protocol and added the treaty to its constitution, women launched the "Together, let's strengthen democracy with gender parity!" campaign. External donors such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), United Nations Development Fund for Women

(UNIFEM), among others supported the domestic actors by providing financial and technical support.<sup>81</sup> Women's organizations did not do it all on their own. Getting the political elite, the women's ministry, and parties on board was key to their success. Nevertheless, the impetus for the gender parity law, strategic adaptations to the national context, and demonstration of domestic support came from a coalition of women's organizations at the national level.

In contrast, Benin has not had a women's coalition for gender quotas. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, women won 10 and 7 percent of the legislative seats, respectively. Individual women's activists advocated for a gender quota law in Benin, but women's organizations were either unable or uninterested in forming a pro-quota coalition. In 2004, a female parliamentarian, Justine Achadé, proposed a parity law.<sup>82</sup> The Ministry of Family at the time also supported the idea of a gender quota law, as well as the president of the National Assembly. In 2006 and 2008, Alice Kang conducted interviews with women's activists and representatives of international donors and found that the quota was not a priority for women leaders and organizations.

On August 24, 2010, the National Assembly voted in favor of a bill that would raise the number of seats in the legislature from 83 to 99 and install a 20 percent gender quota. Shortly thereafter, several individuals including a president of a women's association, Marie-Elise Gbedo, inadmissibly filed a request with the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the bill.<sup>1</sup> Two members of parliament also filed a request with the court. In September, the court invalidated both parts of the bill. The court ruled that the size of the assembly could only expand if there were sufficient financial resources, and that the quota violated the constitutional principle of equality

between the sexes as well as the African Union's Charter on Human and People's Rights.<sup>83</sup>

Unlike women's organizations in Senegal, women's activists in Benin did not adapt a new quota proposal after the ruling despite external support for the quota from FES and USAID. One women's organization, RIFONGA-Benin has since called for the adoption of a parity law, holding workshops with the media in January 2013.<sup>84</sup> Other women's organizations, however, have shied away from calling for parity legislation. To date and to the best of our knowledge, no pro-quota coalition has emerged in Benin.

As the case studies show, a meso-level attention to domestic coalitions contributes to micro-level explanations that center on strategic elites and macro-level explanations that focus on global norms and networks. Political leaders in Benin and Senegal strategically supported the adoption of gender quotas. In the 2000s, the international consensus was clear: women and men ought to be equally represented in public office. Women in Benin and Senegal were attuned to changes occurring at the global level and connected to transnational women's networks. In Senegal, domestic organizations were at the helm of the campaign and made key adjustments when obstacles were presented. Foreign donors were willing to help women's organizations push for quotas in both countries, but women's organizations in Benin did not come together. Without domestic mobilization in the form of a coalition, external efforts were for naught in Benin, while in Senegal the coalition succeeded in introducing a quota.

### **The Importance of Domestic Coalitions**

We have found through statistical analysis and a comparative case study that without domestic coalitions, it is significantly less likely that quota laws are adopted to increase



female legislative representation. These coalitions are constituted by multiple women's organizations that seek to name new public problems, identify and adopt policy solutions, and signal domestic and broad-based support. The coalitions tend to be expansive, cutting across ethnic, religious, party, and other differences, particularly when it comes to issues that challenge societal beliefs and expectations because of the importance of showing widespread support of the reform from key sectors of society.

Although prior work has pointed to the role of women's movements in advancing such reforms, we contend that it is, in fact, a specific form of mobilization, i.e., coalitions, that are critical in bringing about such legislative change. Broader movements are nonetheless important, in part, because coalitions can emerge out of them, and we would not be surprised to see women's coalitions for quotas in countries with vibrant women's movements. To explore this possibility, it is instructive to turn to Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon's dataset on women's movements, in which four of the nine African countries were coded as having a strong or very strong autonomous feminist movement prior to quota adoption (Botswana, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa). In Kenya and Morocco, a pro-quota women's coalition emerged, but not in Botswana.<sup>85</sup> In South Africa, which had a women's coalition, the dominant African National Congress adopted a voluntary party quota. We do not assume that all women's movements will engender coalitions for quotas, as the case of Benin illustrates.

We find that domestic women's groups play a role in the adoption of quotas, above and beyond the efforts of international actors and pressures on governments. Still, we concur with previous studies that the international women's movement, a country's embeddedness in the movement, and foreign aid from democracies is important. We do

not think it is a coincidence that Senegal, which adopted a quota, had twice as many women's organizations per capita attending the UN World Conference in Beijing than that of Benin. Yet, the importance of transnational networking is not to be exaggerated. In our analysis of coalition formation, embeddedness in the international women's movement does not predict whether or how quickly women's coalitions emerged. Foreign aid from democracies does not explain the rise of women's coalitions for quotas. Therefore, our preliminary analysis provides an empirical challenge to the claim that women's coalitions in Africa are Western-driven and import foreign values, a charge that is often articulated by critics and observers.

To be clear, we do not argue that coalitions are the only factor driving major women's rights reform. We find that countries that recently came out of major armed conflict are more likely to adopt gender quotas than countries that had not. (See the Appendix for a comparison with previous studies.) Thus, postconflict countries have higher levels of women's descriptive representation, where women claim on average 32 percent of the legislative seats compared with non-conflict countries, where women claimed 16 percent of the seats. In results not reported here, having women's rights provisions in peace accords also significantly correlate with quota adoption. Our results, not surprisingly, also support the claim that a country's type of electoral system matters. Countries with plurality electoral systems appear less likely and slower to have domestic women's coalitions and adopt gender quota laws than are countries with mixed or proportional representation systems. Different electoral institutions encourage women's advocates to pursue different measures for improving women's descriptive representation.

Strikingly, women's coalitions appear to matter more than other domestic factors that are conventionally seen as important. We find that authoritarian regimes in Africa are just as likely as democracies to adopt gender quotas, perhaps to gain greater control of the legislature or to gain greater legitimacy in the global hierarchy of modern market democracies.<sup>86</sup> We find no significant difference in adoption between countries under left-leaning rule and countries under centrist or right-leaning rule, although our null finding may reflect the fact that we examine the post-Cold War period. Melanie Hughes and Aili Mari Tripp find that left-party rule had a significant impact on women's numerical representation in the 1980s; after the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship disappears.<sup>87</sup> Our focus on candidate quota laws and reserved seat systems, as opposed to voluntary party quotas, may also mask the impact of leftist ideology.<sup>88</sup> There does not appear to be a relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the adoption of quotas. We draw from this null finding that it may take only one or a handful of motivated female MPs working together or allied with women's coalitions to effectively push for reform, affirming the importance of having critical actors rather than a critical mass of women in office.<sup>89</sup>

Women's coalitions for quotas are forming and appear to make an impact in Muslim-majority countries. In fact, our models suggest that coalitions are more likely to form in Muslim countries than are non-Muslim countries, challenging conventional notions about Islam. In our comparative case study, a pro-quota women's coalition emerged in predominantly Muslim Senegal, which adopted a parity law, but not in Benin, where only 24 percent of the population is Muslim. We also note that by the end of 2014, 72 percent of Muslim-majority countries in Africa had adopted gender quotas, compared

to 52 percent of Christian-majority and 31 percent of mixed religion countries. For proponents of the Islamic barrier hypothesis, these patterns may be surprising. On the other hand, the earliest adopters of reserved seat systems in the world were Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, and Sudan.

In this paper, we have posited that women's coalitions may be more likely to form in contexts where ethnicity or race is a dominant cleavage. Depending on the measure, we found support that pro-quota coalitions are more likely to emerge in countries where the politicization of ethnic difference is stronger. We also find mixed support that countries are slower and less likely to adopt quotas in contexts where ethnicity is more politicized. More theoretical consideration and empirical work needs to be done to examine how cleavages on one dimension that generally favor men present special opportunities and challenges for coalition building among women's organizations.

Thus, we argue that coalitions formed specifically to increase female legislative representation through the introduction of quota legislation are essential to bringing about such reforms. We find that international pressures are important, but without domestic collective action they are insufficient. Our study confirms the importance of postconflict factors and the electoral system. Our findings regarding the politicization of ethnic difference and the role of ideology are inconclusive. We find that the percentage of women in parliament does not influence the adoption of quotas, further suggesting that coalitions play a greater role than individual women in parliament.

### **Implications for Future Research**

This article shows how women's collective action at the national level is critical in an era of globalization. Nearly every quantitative study of international influence and quota

adoption mentions activism by women on the ground. Up until now, however, few crossnational analyses have incorporated the national dimension satisfactorily because of the lack of data. International influences on women's rights adoption have been easier to quantify, and empirical work has focused accordingly. Using a new data set, we found that the formation of domestic coalitions corresponds with the adoption of gender quotas in Africa, even when controlling for connections to the international women's movement, the strength of the global women's movement, and international aid from established democracies.

A broader implication of our study is that theories of transnational activism do not fully consider the politics behind policymaking. In the boomerang and spiral models that explore these dynamics, domestic groups facing a repressive government reach out to other countries and international bodies to put pressure on unresponsive states.<sup>90</sup> Yet, as many governments have liberalized, the assumption of the obstructive state may be less relevant today. The models provide a useful but incomplete understanding of politics at the national level, leaving open questions about whether women's organizations matter because of international forces or above and beyond it. This study proposed that domestic women's organizations perform significant advocacy work in naming public problems, identifying and adapting policy proposals, and signaling domestic and broad-based support. A more integrative theory of political change considers the preferences and collective action of domestic actors outside the state.

Moreover, looking primarily at the impact of international pressures on domestic politics makes it difficult to appreciate the ways in which domestic actors themselves influence global norms. African women's rights activists, for example, have influenced

global discussions regarding quota adoption, gender budgeting, peacebuilding, micro-credit, and many other concerns.<sup>91</sup>

Our study points to important new directions for the scholarship on women, gender, and politics. Scholars should examine whether coalitions have an impact in the same way around other women's rights concerns, and why coalitions sometimes fail to influence policy. Country studies should examine further in depth the role of domestic allies in women's policy agencies, political parties, and women's parliamentary groups in bringing about reform. Scholars and policymakers also need more nuanced, issue-specific measures of aid (e.g., foreign aid to women's organizations) to assess whether shifts in funding priorities affect the efficacy of group-level collective action. Peace Medie finds that women's organizations play a crucial role in enforcing domestic violence laws in Liberia, raising the question of whether coalitions influence policy implementation.<sup>92</sup>

This study has clear implications for understanding major change in other types of reform. To understand how reform occurs on issues related to the environment, health, human rights, and labor it is necessary to look not just at social movements but also at the specific coalitions that emerge around particular issues. These coalitions are often inspired or aided by treaties and external pressures, but without such coalitions the agreements, especially around controversial issues, are not necessarily enforced. Future comparative work should extend this study to other areas to see whether there are differences in the impact of coalitions on other issues such as environmental concerns, human rights, or labor issues.

Women around the world are entering public office in greater numbers than ever before. As such, researchers are seeking to understand the policy impact of female

elected officials. Thus far, the existing scholarship finds that there are limits to descriptive representation; increasing the number of women in office alone does not automatically translate into women's substantive representation.<sup>93</sup> Our work, combined with previous scholarship on women's movements, suggests that coalitions of organizations can help make elected officials act for the interests of marginalized groups such as women, serving as a missing link between individual voters and those in power. Whether in Benin, Senegal, or the United States, the challenges and potential of building domestic coalitions endure. We call for more attention to the power of collective action among organizations not just across but also within national borders.

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Jones 1996; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Tripp and Kang 2008; Yoon 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Bush 2011; Cole 2013; Edgell 2017; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Swiss and Fallon 2016.

<sup>3</sup> e.g., The Union of International Associations' *Yearbook of International Organizations*.

<sup>4</sup> Keck and Sikkink 1998.

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- <sup>5</sup> Norris and Dahlerup 2015.
- <sup>6</sup> Bauer 2012; Bauer and Britton 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009.
- <sup>7</sup> See Berry and Wilcox 2015; Sabatier 1988; Skocpol 1992; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010.
- <sup>8</sup> McBride and Mazur 2010; Weldon 2002; Htun and Weldon 2012.
- <sup>9</sup> E.g., McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery 2001; Soule and King 2006.
- <sup>10</sup> Hughes and Tripp 2015; Tripp 2015a.
- <sup>11</sup> Gamson 1961, 374.
- <sup>12</sup> Coalition governments in parliamentary democracies constitute a separate area of inquiry. For scholars of interest groups, lobbying coalitions constitute “any coordinated effort by interests to lobby government with the aim of advancing a shared advocacy agenda,” as defined in Nelson and Yackee 2012, 339; see also Baumgartner et al. 2009, 6. In public policy, advocacy coalitions consist of individuals and groups working in different positions who seek to see their shared, core beliefs translated into policy, as defined in Sabatier 1988. For political sociologists, a social movement coalition “pools resources and coordinates plans, while keeping distinct organizational identities,” defined in Zald and Ash 1966, 335; see also Staggenborg 1986. This study sees common definitions and questions across these broad literatures, although we note that the advocacy coalition framework in public policy is more encompassing and includes government officials, among others individuals, under the term. For clarity, and in line with the interest group and social movement literatures, we categorize supportive individuals in policy agencies, political parties, the executive branch, and the judiciary as *allies*. Individuals who simultaneously hold positions in the state and in social organizations are *bridges*, outlined in McCammon 2012.
- <sup>13</sup> Abbas 2010; Mwatha 2017; Pratt 2017.
- <sup>14</sup> Baldez 2004.
- <sup>15</sup> Luciak 1998.
- <sup>16</sup> Costa Benavides 2003.
- <sup>17</sup> Abou-Zeid 2003; Bauer and Britton 2006; Connell 1998; Disney 2008; Myakayaka-Manzini 2003; Tripp 2000.
- <sup>18</sup> Soule and King 2006.
- <sup>19</sup> Basu 2016; Tripp et al. 2009.
- <sup>20</sup> Kang 2015.
- <sup>21</sup> Ferree and Hess 1994.
- <sup>22</sup> Hula 1999, 7.
- <sup>23</sup> Krook and Norris 2014.
- <sup>24</sup> Matembe 2002; Tripp 2000.
- <sup>25</sup> Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Rakner and van de Walle 2009.
- <sup>26</sup> Bleck and van de Walle 2013.
- <sup>27</sup> Merry 2006, 1.
- <sup>28</sup> Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009.
- <sup>29</sup> McCammon 2012.
- <sup>30</sup> Interview with Aili Mari Tripp, translated from French, September 25, 2016.
- <sup>31</sup> Abdullah 1995; Kabira and Nzioki 1993.
- <sup>32</sup> Fallon 2008; Tripp et al. 2009.
- <sup>33</sup> Tsikata 2009.

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- <sup>34</sup> Kabira 2012.
- <sup>35</sup> Cottrell and Ghai 2007, 11.
- <sup>36</sup> Anderson 2016.
- <sup>37</sup> Beck 2003.
- <sup>38</sup> Arriola and Johnson 2014; Goetz and Hassim 2002; Skocpol 1992; Steady 2006.
- <sup>39</sup> Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010.
- <sup>40</sup> Tripp 2015b.
- <sup>41</sup> We are not aware of two-stage discrete time event history models that would provide an additional check on our findings.
- <sup>42</sup> Singer and Willett 2003, 523.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, 421.
- <sup>44</sup> The results concerning coalitions as an independent variable are substantively similar when we use logistic discrete-time models and when we use cubic time polynomials. Our findings about coalitions are also similar when we use the continuous-time Cox and Weibull models. Where coalition formation is the dependent variable, we include an interaction term of *Postconflict* and *Time*. Where quota adoption is the dependent variable, we include an interaction term of *Plurality* and *Time*. After using Cox models, we use the postestimation estat phtest, detail command to identify potential variables.
- <sup>45</sup> This is in line with Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015. We seek to introduce more rigor in coding the dependent variable by locating the country's constitution or legislation with the quota provision to determine the date of adoption. If some of our years are inconsistent with that of others, our sources can be found in the supplemental materials. Our main source is International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2015.
- <sup>46</sup> Liberia's quota only applied in the 2005 elections but most political parties did nothing to implement it at the time. In our robustness checks, we recode Liberia as having not adopted a quota. The results remain similar.
- <sup>47</sup> Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and South Sudan are excluded due to missing data or late independence.
- <sup>48</sup> Kang 2014.
- <sup>49</sup> *Bulletin RECOFEM* 2006, p. 14.
- <sup>50</sup> Kayuni and Muriaas 2014.
- <sup>51</sup> Women in Law in Southern Africa-Swaziland N.d.
- <sup>52</sup> Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015. *International women's movement* is based on a factor analysis of the cumulative founding of women's INGOs; cumulative number of international conferences, UN treaties and UN groups on women; and UNIFEM's resources. We extrapolate the variable for 2009 to 2014 using Stata's ipolate command and epolate option.
- <sup>53</sup> United Nations N.d. Here and for other variables, before using the log transformation to reduce skew, we add 0.001 to zero values. Alternative models use Bush's and Hughes, Krook, and Paxton's measures of WINGOs. We use the Beijing-based variable as it has fewer missing observations. The results concerning coalitions remain substantively similar.
- <sup>54</sup> Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015.
- <sup>55</sup> Bush 2011; Edgell 2017.

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- <sup>56</sup> OECD 2015. We use Stata's `ipolate` command and `epolate` option to fill in missing information for Libya and South Africa.
- <sup>57</sup> In previous versions of the study, we included a more specific measure of foreign aid, *Log UN aid for women per capita*, the natural log of ODA per capita disbursed by the United Nations to institutions and non-governmental organizations working on gender equality and women's empowerment, from OECD 2015. Models with UN aid have a starting risk year of 2002 due to incomplete data before then. Author correspondence with the OECD, March 18, 2015.
- <sup>58</sup> Bush 2011. Bush's variable ends in 2010. We use the United Nations' peacekeeping websites listed in our codebook to fill in gaps for 2011 to 2014. The variable does not attain statistical significance. The other results remain similar.
- <sup>59</sup> Anderson and Swiss 2014; Bauer and Britton 2006; Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015; Hughes and Tripp 2015; Tripp 2015a. When we use Anderson and Swiss's peace accord with women's rights provision variable, it predicts adoption perfectly and is dropped, supporting their finding peace accords that promote women's rights create opportunities for the adoption of gender quotas. The coefficient for coalition remains positive and significant at the 0.10 level.
- <sup>60</sup> Hughes and Tripp 2015; Tripp 2015a; IPU 2015a.
- <sup>61</sup> Marshall and Jagers 2011.
- <sup>62</sup> Hassim 2006; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Walsh 2012; Waylen 2003.
- <sup>63</sup> Vogt et al. 2015. Cape Verde, Comoros, and Equatorial Guinea are missing for the variable.
- <sup>64</sup> Laserud and Taphorn 2007.
- <sup>65</sup> IPU 2015a.
- <sup>66</sup> In our main models, Eritrea, Swaziland, and Uganda drop out because plurality is coded as missing before quotas are adopted.
- <sup>67</sup> Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh 2001, corrected and updated by the authors using the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015a and Socialist International 2015.
- <sup>68</sup> IPU 2015b; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006.
- <sup>69</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003.
- <sup>70</sup> World Bank 2015. We fill in missing data using Stata's `ipolate` command and `epolate` option.
- <sup>71</sup> Pew Forum 2009.
- <sup>72</sup> World Bank 2015. Another possible indicator of women's status is the year in which women gained suffrage, which we do not include because the majority of African countries allowed women to vote at independence. Women's suffrage does not attain statistical significance in Anderson and Swiss 2014 and Bush 2011.
- <sup>73</sup> In our robustness checks, UNPKO is positive and statistically significant.
- <sup>74</sup> Posner 2004. We use data for 1990.
- <sup>75</sup> Fox 2011, 2012.
- <sup>76</sup> UNTC 2015.
- <sup>77</sup> Benin's number of organizations at Beijing per capita is higher than the mean and Senegal's is one standard deviation above the mean. In this way, we did not choose "easy" cases.
- <sup>78</sup> Sall 2013.
- <sup>79</sup> Conseil Constitutionnel du Sénégal 2007.

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- <sup>80</sup> COSEF 2011, 40.
- <sup>81</sup> COSEF 2011.
- <sup>82</sup> *Quotidien Nokoué*, October 9, 2004, p. 3
- <sup>83</sup> Cour Constitutionnelle du Bénin 2010.
- <sup>84</sup> Ahouansè 2013.
- <sup>85</sup> Htun and Weldon 2012.
- <sup>86</sup> Bauer and Burnet 2013; Dahlerup 2006; Towns 2012; Tripp 2013.
- <sup>87</sup> Hughes and Tripp 2015.
- <sup>88</sup> Caul 2001.
- <sup>89</sup> On collaboration among female officials, see Barnes 2016.
- <sup>90</sup> Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999.
- <sup>91</sup> Badri and Tripp 2017.
- <sup>92</sup> Medie 2013.
- <sup>93</sup> Htun 2016; Walsh 2012; Weldon 2002, 2011.


Appendix. A Comparison of Studies

Concept	Measure	Bush 2011	Cole 2013	Anderson and Swiss 2014	Hughes, Krook, Paxton 2015	This study
Women's coalitions						+
International women's movement	(1) CEDAW ratification global density (2) Hughes et al (3) Time		+ (1)		+ (2)	+ (3)
Embedded in international women's movement	(1) Log women's INGOs (2) Count women's INGOs (3) Above average WINGOs (4) Share possible WINGOs	NS (1)	+ / NS (2)	+ / NS (3)	+ (4)	+
Aid from established democracies		+				+
Postconflict	(1) UNPKO (2) in civil war (3) peace accord (4) after war	+ (1)	NS (2)	+ (3)	+ (4)	+ (4) NS (1) + (3)
Level of democracy	(1) Freedom House (2) Polity	NS (1)	NS (2)	NS (2)	NS (1)	NS (2)
Democratic change	(1) increase in polity, $t-1$ (2) transition after 1975		+ (1)	NS (2)		NS (3)
Women in parliament			NS	NS	-	NS
Plurality system				-	- / NS	-
Level of wealth		NS	-	NS	NS	NS
Muslim majority		NS	NS			NS

Note: NS = not significant.



Figure 1. The Adoption of Gender Quotas in Africa, 1989-2014



*Note:* The line shows the cumulative number of countries with gender quotas laws or reserved seats for women in the lower-house or unicameral legislature that meet a 10 percent minimum threshold. Bars refer to the number of adoptions in the given year.

Table 1. Correlates of the Emergence of Coalitions, 1989-2014 (Discrete time complementary log-log event history models)

	International factors	+ Domestic factors
	1	2
<i>International factors</i>		
International women's movement	0.12 (0.20)	0.20 (0.19)
Log women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million	-0.18 (0.49)	-0.01 (0.79)
Int'l women's move x log women's NGOs	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.08)
Log DAC aid per capita ( $t-1$ )	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.37** (0.12)
<i>Domestic factors</i>		
Postconflict		4.41** (1.54)
Level of democracy		0.05 (0.04)
Number of ethnopolitical groups		0.17** (0.05)
Plurality electoral system		-1.11* (0.56)
Log GNI per capita ( $t-1$ )		-0.55* (0.24)
Muslim majority		1.31** (0.46)
Time	0.12** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)
Postconflict x time		-0.29* (0.13)
Constant	-4.91** (1.65)	-3.85 (2.78)
Log-pseudolikelihood	-106.06	-94.71
Number of observations	713	713
Number of coalitions	28	28
Number of countries	41	41

Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; two-tailed tests.

Table 2. Coalitions and the Adoption of Gender Quotas, 1989-2014

	Adoption		No adoption	
Coalition	Algeria	Morocco	Cameroon	Mali
	Burkina Faso	Niger	Central African	Namibia
	Burundi	Rwanda	Republic	Nigeria
	Cape Verde	Senegal	Cote d'Ivoire	Sierra Leone
	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Somalia	Ghana	South Africa
	Egypt	South Sudan	Guinea-Bissau	Zambia
	Guinea	Sudan	Madagascar	
	Kenya	Togo		
	Liberia	Tunisia		
	Libya	Zimbabwe		
	Mauritania			
		N = 21		N = 12
No coalition	Angola		Benin	The Gambia
	Congo, Rep.		Botswana	Malawi
	Djibouti		Chad	Mauritius
	Eritrea		Comoros	Mozambique
	Lesotho		Equatorial	Sao Tome &
	Swaziland		Guinea	Principe
	Tanzania		Ethiopia	Seychelles
	Uganda		Gabon	
		N = 8		N = 13

*Notes:* Gender quotas refer to laws or reserved seats systems. In the statistical analyses, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and South Sudan are excluded due to missing data or late independence.

Table 3. Correlates of the Adoption of Gender Quotas, 1989-2014 (Discrete time complementary log-log event history models)

	International factors	+ Domestic factors	+ Women's coalition	Full sample of countries
	1	2	3	4
<i>Domestic coalitions</i>				
Women's coalition			2.40*** (0.59)	1.93*** (0.47)
<i>International factors</i>				
International women's movement	0.14 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.24 (0.21)
Log women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million	0.34 (0.40)	0.56 (0.43)	0.98 (0.60)	0.93* (0.37)
Int'l women's move x log women's NGOs	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.10+ (0.05)	-0.09* (0.03)
Log DAC aid per capita ( <i>t</i> -1)	0.43 (0.27)	0.80* (0.36)	0.87** (0.29)	0.50* (0.23)
<i>Domestic factors</i>				
Postconflict		2.17** (0.78)	2.69** (0.88)	1.29** (0.45)
Level of democracy		-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.04)
Number of ethnopolitical groups		-0.08 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)	
Plurality electoral system		2.21 (1.68)	1.91 (1.68)	
Log GNI per capita ( <i>t</i> -1)		-0.43 (0.33)	-0.18 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.21)
Muslim majority		0.89+ (0.50)	0.37 (0.51)	0.13 (0.44)
Time	0.13** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.12** (0.04)
Plurality x time		-0.19* (0.09)	-0.18* (0.09)	
Constant	-8.29** (2.61)	-7.23+ (3.96)	-6.78 (4.18)	-4.44+ (2.48)
Log-pseudolikelihood	-93.67	-79.88	-70.38	-99.72
Number of observations	863	863	863	1088
Number of adoptions	23	23	23	27
Number of countries	44	44	44	50

Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; two-tailed tests.

Table 4. Correlates of the Adoption of Gender Quotas, Alternative Control Variables (Discrete time complementary log-log event history models)

	+ Democratic transition	+ Left leaning rule	+ Women in parliament	+ Women's labor force	Years: 1989-2008
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Domestic coalitions</i>					
Women's coalition	2.02*** (0.46)	2.09*** (0.46)	2.08*** (0.46)	1.99*** (0.47)	1.79** (0.65)
<i>International factors</i>					
International women's movement	-0.19 (0.22)	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.21 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.66)
Log women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million	1.24+ (0.65)	1.17* (0.59)	1.21+ (0.65)	1.08+ (0.63)	1.34 <sup>a</sup> (0.90)
Int'l women's move x log women's NGOs	-0.12+ (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.11+ (0.06)	-0.10+ (0.06)	-0.12 (0.08)
Log DAC aid per capita (t-1)	0.51+ (0.27)	0.48+ (0.27)	0.50+ (0.29)	0.70** (0.27)	0.72* (0.36)
<i>Domestic factors</i>					
Postconflict	1.92* (0.84)	2.01** (0.75)	1.98* (0.80)	2.14* (0.87)	1.57* (0.70)
Level of democracy	-0.08+ (0.05)	-0.09+ (0.05)	-0.09+ (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.19* (0.08)
Number of ethnopolitical groups	-0.16* (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.19* (0.08)	-0.10+ (0.06)
Democratic transition	0.56 (0.62)				
Left-leaning rule		0.34 (0.47)			
Women in parliament, %			0.02 (0.03)		
Female labor force, %				-0.07**	

( <i>t-1</i> )									
Log GNI per capita ( <i>t-1</i> )	-0.07	-0.16	-0.07	-0.07	-0.42	-0.71	(0.03)		
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.49)			
Muslim majority	-0.08	-0.06	0.01	0.01	-0.59	-0.86			
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.57)	(0.74)			
Time	0.11*	0.11*	0.10*	0.10*	0.13*	0.13			
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.23)			
Constant	-4.90	-4.38	-4.84	-4.84	-1.12	-2.05			
	(3.24)	(3.44)	(3.22)	(3.22)	(4.55)	(4.61)			
Log-pseudolikelihood	-93.35	-93.60	-93.65	-93.65	-85.80	-52.21			
Number of observations	1014	1014	1009	1009	969	851			
Number of adoptions	26	26	26	26	25	13			
Number of countries	47	47	47	47	46	47			

Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.  
+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; two-tailed tests.

Table 5. Predicted Probabilities of the Adoption of Gender Quotas by the end of 2000

	Predicted probability of adoption
Baseline	.04
Women's coalition=1	.37
Women's coalition=0, Postconflict=1	.47
Women's coalition=1, Postconflict=1	.99
Women's coalition=0, Postconflict=0, Women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million=1.45	.06
Baseline + 10 years (Year=2010)	.28

*Notes:* The mean predicted probability of adoption is calculated using the coefficients from Model 3 in Table 3. In the baseline prediction, women's coalition and postconflict is 0. For all rows, the international women's movement is 7.75 (the 2000 value). We report the anti-log of Log women's NGOs at Beijing per 1 million at the 50th percentile (top four and sixth rows) and 90th percentile (fifth row). Log DAC aid per capita ( $t-1$ ) and log GNI per capita ( $t-1$ ) are set at the mean. Level of democracy is 0 and the number of ethnopolitical groups is 5 (the median values). Plurality electoral system and Muslim majority are 0.

Table 6. A Comparison of Benin and Senegal, 1990

	GNI per capita (Atlas Method)	Overseas development aid, % of GNI	Overseas development aid, per capita (USD)	NGOs at Beijing, per 1 million inhabitants	Female labor force, % of total labor force	Quota law, year
Benin	360	13.9	53.4	0.7	41.7	No
Senegal	710	14.7	108.0	2.1	41.8	2010

*Sources:* United Nations N.d.; World Bank 2015.

<sup>a</sup> Share of total possible women's international nongovernmental organizations in country *i*.